





Comparative overview of economic profiles and roles of China and 
India in Asian international production networks 
 
Witada Anukoonwattaka  
 
Despite the fact that China and India have gone through the period of high 
growth in the 2000s (figure 5), there are considerable differences in terms of 
economic structure, sources of growth and trade patterns. The differences have 
resulted in divergent performances by the two countries in Asian IPNs. This chapter 
provides a comparative overview of the economic structure and participation of China 
and India in Asian IPNs to enable the current position of India to be evaluated, with 
China being used as a benchmark. 
 





























































































Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
1. Macro comparisons of economic structures 
 
China and India are the world’s two most populous countries. In 2010, China 
accounted for nearly 20 per cent of the global population, while for India it was 
approximately 18 per cent. Output and income per capita of China was significantly 
higher than that of India (table1). Based on real GDP per capita, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP) to reflect the actual purchasing power of a country, 





Table 1. Economic profiles of China and India 
 
      1990  1995 2000  2005 2008 2009 2010 
Population          
(million 
people) 
China 1  142  1 211  1 267  1 312  1 337  1 346  1 354 
India 862  953 1  043 1 131  1 181  1 198  1 214 
Share of world 
population (%) 
China 21.6  21.2 20.7 20.2 19.8 19.7 19.6 
India 16.3  16.7 17.0 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.6 
GDP                  
(million US$ ) 
China 404  494  756 960  1 192 836  2 302 719  4 416 104  4 984 426    
India 326  796  369 240  467 788  840 470  1 281 330  1 287 292    
GDP per 
capita                  
( 2005 US 
dollars) 
China 469  790 1  141 1 755  2 429  2 633    
India 409  475 576 743 897 953    
GDP per 
capita                 
(2005 PPP US 
dollars) 
China 1  094  1 840  2 658  4 088  5 658  6 134    
India 1  230  1 426  1 731  2 235  2 697  2 864    
Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
(a) Structure  of  GDP   
 
China and India experienced a significant decline in agricultural production 
during the past two decades (figure 6). In the case of China, output has been shifting 
towards the industrial and services sectors. The industrial sector of China increased its 
share in total value-added from 40 per cent in 1990 to 48 per cent in 2009, while its share 
of the service sector increased from 34 per cent to 41 per cent during the same period. In 
contrast, India’s production has shifted toward services. India’s share of services in total 
value-added increased steadily from 42 per cent in 1990 to 55 per cent in 2009, while its 
















Figure 6. Shares in GDP by economic sectors 
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
In terms of growth, the service sector of India grew notably faster than the 
industrial sector, especially during the late 1990s (figure 7). In China, by contrast, the 
industrial sector grew slightly faster than the services sector. The performance of 
India’s service sector led to the praise that Indian’s growth pattern had revealed an 
alternative growth model that was driven by services and which skipped the phase of 
a typical labour-intensive industrialization exemplified by the rapid growth of East 
and South-East Asian economies. However, employment in the economic sectors 
shows that India’s rapidly growing service sectors may have a limited impact on 




Figure 7. Growth of production by economic sector 
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While the agricultural sector represents a minor part of total value-added of 
China and India, in terms of employment that sector is still the most important one for 
both countries, the employment share of China was 50 per cent while that of India was 
60 per cent in 2000 (figure 8). The industrial sector accounted for 23 per cent of 
employment in China, and contributed 46 per cent of Chinese GDP in the same year. 
The service sector contributed 28 per cent of total employment, and accounted for 39 
per cent of the Chinese GDP.
17   Despite a commonality in agriculture, India’s 
employment and production structure appears to be the reverse of that in China: in 2000, 
India’s services sector generated more than 50 per cent of the country’s GDP, while 
accounting for only 24 per cent of total employment. The industrial sector generated 16 
per cent of employment and accounted for 27 per cent of India’s GDP. 
18 
 
In terms of wages, labour costs in India appear to be lower than in China. For 
example, according to Kalish (2006), International Monetary Fund (IMF) data reveals 
that the monthly wage of a typical manufacturing worker in India was US$ 23.80 in 
2002, while for China the figure was US$ 110.80. Thus, it appears that India has not 






16 Data related to employment and wage in China and India should be taken cautiously. The data for 
unregistered sectors are usually not reported.   
17 Chinese employment data show that the agricultural sector accounted for 40 per cent of Chinese 
employment in 2008, followed by the services sector (33 per cent) and industrial sector (27 per cent). 
For India, the latest employment data are available only up to 2000 (see figure 8). 
18The sectoral distribution of India’s employment and output appears to support the argument by some 
reports, such as Gordon and Gupta (2004), that rapid increases in Indian output were related to IT 
services, which are relatively skills-intensive and have small impact on job creation. 
19 Recognizing the importance of the manufacturing sector with regard to employment creation, India 
plans to increase the share of manufacturing in total value-added and employment. A draft national 
manufacturing policy was approved in 2011. For more details, see chapter IV of this book.  
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Inner circle: Share of employment






















In 2010, China’s trade value was more than quadruple that of India. China’s 
total exports (merchandise and services) amounted to US$ 3,335 billion versus US$ 765 
billion for India. The export dependency of the Chinese economy is considerably higher 
than it is in India. Before the impact of the global economic crisis significantly affected 
export figures, the share of China’s exports in GDP was more than 35 per cent in 2008, 
while for India it was less than 25 per cent (figure 9).   
 
Figure 9. Shares of exports in GDP 
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
Exports of goods by China now account for more than 90 per cent of that 
country’s total exports, while the figure for India is still well below 70 per cent (table 
2). Services play a more important role in trade by India than trade by China, 
especially on the export side. The services sector share of Indian exports rose from 27  
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per cent in 2000 to a peak of 35 per cent in 2008, while the sector’s share of Chinese 
exports remained at about 10 per cent throughout that period. During the economic 
crisis in 2009, services trade was relatively resilience compared to trade in goods 
(Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review, 2011). As a result, since most of China’s 
exports are goods, the country was hit harder by the adverse impact of the global 
economic crisis than India as a considerable proportion of Indian exports comprise 
services. 
 
Table 2. Shares of goods and services in trade by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
Year China  India 
  Exports   Imports  Exports  Imports 
  Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services Goods  Services 
2000  89.2 10.8 86.3 13.7 72.6 27.4  73.2  26.8 
2005  91.2  8.8  88.8 11.2 65.6 34.4  75.3  24.7 
2008  90.3  9.7  87.8 12.2 64.6 35.4  78.5  21.5 
2009  90.3  9.7  86.4 13.6 66.4 33.6  76.2  23.8 
2010  90.3  9.7  87.9 12.1 66.4 33.6  73.4  26.6 
 





Many empirical studies have documented the fact that machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7) are predominant sectors in terms of international fragmentation 
of production.
21 Trade patterns of countries that have been extensively involved in the 
product fragmentation process are likely to have a considerable share of machinery 
and transport equipment. Therefore, the share of those sectors in trade sometimes has 
been used as a general indicator for IPN participation in empirical studies, apart from 
indicators that focus specifically on trade in parts and components.
22 
 
According to the World Bank (2011), manufacturing currently accounts for 32 
per cent of China’s output while for India the figure is 16 per cent. Within the 
manufacturing sector, machinery and transport equipment account for 25 per cent of 
Chinese manufacturing output, but less than 20 per cent in India.  
 
The difference between the two countries is more notable when it comes to the 
role of the manufacturing sector in exports. Exports of manufacturing products have 
                                                            
 
20 The manufacturing sector is defined as SITC (Rev.3) 5 to 8, excluding SITC 68. 
21 See, for example, Ando, 2006; Ando and Kimura, 2005 and 2009; and Athukorala, 2010a and 2010b. 




been growing in importance in China’s export structure, and currently account for 85 
per cent of total exports (table 3). The share of the manufacturing sector in Indian 
exports is significantly lower than its share in Chinese exports, and has declined from 
56 per cent to 42 per cent during the past decade.   
 
There has been a noticeable shift in the composition of China’s exports, from 
conventional labour-intensive product lines such as apparel, footwear, toys and sports 
goods to more sophisticated goods in machinery product lines.
23 From 2000 to 2010, 
the share of miscellaneous manufactures (SITC 8) – a miscellaneous group 
encompassing most of the traditional labour-intensive products – in total exports of 
manufactures declined from 39 per cent to 26 per cent, while the share of machinery 
and transport equipment increased from 38 per cent to 53 per cent. By contrast, Indian 
manufacturing exports are characterized by resource-based materials such as primary 
and fabricated metals (SITC6-68). The share of machinery and transport equipment 
remains small, although it increased significantly from 9 per cent to 23 per cent 
between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of manufacturing exports by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
SITC   China  India 
Rev.3   2000  2005 2008  2009 2010 2000 2005 2008 2009  2010 
5  Chemicals 5.5  5.1 6.0 5.5 5.9  13.2 16.1 18.1 15.8  17.1 




17.8  16.9 18.2 15.4 15.7 50.3 45.2 40.9 34.0  40.1 
7  Machinery and 
transport 
equipments 
37.6  50.3 50.6 52.6 52.9  9.4 14.9 21.8 23.0  23.1 
8  Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
articles 
39.1  27.7 25.2 26.6 25.5 27.1 23.7 19.3 27.2  19.7 
  All 
manufacturing 
products 
100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  Shares of 
manufacturing  
sector in total 
exports 
78.7  83.8 84.4 84.6 84.5 56.4 46.7 37.9 46.0  42.4 
Source: Calculation based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS database. 
 
A closer examination of the machinery and transport equipment subsector 
reveals that information and communications technology (ICT) products (SITC77-
                                                            
 




772-776) has been a major driver of the remarkable growth of China’s machinery 
exports. The share of ICT products in exports of manufactures by China increased 
from less than 15 per cent in 1994/95 to nearly 33 per cent in 2007/08. In the case of 
India, it appears that the country’s export success in IT services has not been 
associated with ICT hardware sector. The share of ICT exports remains very small 
(below 3 per cent of manufacturing exports) throughout the same period (figure 10). 
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Source: Based on data from Athukorala, 2011.  
Note:  In Athukorala (2011), developing Asia covers 12 developing Asian economies including China, Hong 
Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
 
 
A relatively similar pattern is found on the import side. Manufacturing 
accounts for one-half of Chinese imports, but only one-third of Indian imports. 
Machinery and transport equipment dominate imports of manufactures by both 












Table 4. Distribution of manufacturing imports by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
SITC   China  India 
Rev.3   2000  2005 2008 2009 2010  2000 2005 2008 2009  2010 
5  Chemicals 18.3  17.4 18.1 18.6 18.6  20.8 20.2 24.7 21.4  22.4 
6 -68  Resource-
based products 
20.5  13.6 10.9 11.1 9.7  35.7 30.1 23.2 25.2  31.1 
7  Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
53.7  57.0 58.1 57.8 59.1  34.7 42.0 46.4 45.7  40.0 
8  Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
articles 
7.5  12.1 12.8 12.4 12.6  8.8 7.7 5.7 7.7  6.6 
  All 
manufacturing 
products 
100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
  Shares of 
manufacturing  
sector in total 
imports 
62.5  59.1 49.8 50.7 49.7  31.9 35.4 34.0 37.7  28.3 
 
Source: Calculated based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS database. 
 
The trade patterns reviewed above indicate that the manufacturing trade of 
China is largely characterized by two-way trading in the machinery and transport 
equipment sector on an aggregate level (at 1-digit SITC Rev.3). For India, the trade 
pattern is largely characterized by traditional inter-industry trade. Manufacturing trade 
by India is more about exporting resource-based manufacturing materials, and 
importing machinery and transport equipment. According to Kochhar and others 
(2006), India’s industrial development policy from independence until the early 1990s 
focused on import substitution more than export orientation. Consequently, Indian 
manufacturing production has emphasized industries that are capital-intensive and 
large-scale, rather than labour-intensive; in fact, such distorted industrial structures 
remain despite the regulation reforms that have taken place. One implication that can 
be drawn from observing the trade patterns of India is that sophisticated 
manufacturing industries in India have not been associated with the country’s export 
competiveness.  
 
3. Intraregional trade 
 
Participation in Asian IPNs is partly reflected in high involvement in 
intraregional trade because parts and components at different stages of production will 
be traded back and forth between countries in the production networks. From 1998 to 
2009, the shares of intraregional imports ranged between 51 per cent and 57 per cent  
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of total Chinese imports, while the share of intraregional exports was between 45 per 
cent and 52 per cent (figure 11).  
 
Intraregional trading by China is largely dominated by trade with ASEAN, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. China’s trade with these countries is skewed 
towards imports more than exports. This asymmetry in the intraregional trade 
structure partly reflects the fact that East and South-East Asian countries are 
supplying inputs for China’s exports to the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 11. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade of China, 1998-2009   
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011.  
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Compared to China, India’s trade is significantly less integrated with 
intraregional markets (figure 12).
24 Intraregional exports by India remained at around 
30 per cent throughout the past decade. However, India has been increasingly 
sourcing from countries within the region. The share of India’s intraregional imports 
increased from less than 30 per cent in the early 2000s to 39 per cent in 2009. 
Throughout the study period, India’s trade with other members of the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was negligible. 
 
 
Figure 12. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade by India, 1998-2009 
 

















































24 Eight member States of the South Asian Free Trade Area include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
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Figure 12. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade by India, 1998-2009 
(Continued) 


































Intra Asia-Pacific Intra-SAFTA 
 
Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
 
4. Intraregional trade in manufacturing products 
 
Participation in Asian IPNs will result in a larger proportion of intraregional 
trade particularly in manufacturing products. Consistent with the view that China has 
been increasingly acting as a centre of final assembly and an export platform for 
Asian IPNs,  the shares of intraregional exports and imports in Chinese manufacturing 
exports and imports have been large but asymmetric (figure 13). Currently, more than 
60 per cent of Chinese manufacturing imports are sourced within the region, while 
intraregional manufacturing exports account for about 50 per cent of Chinese 
manufacturing exports.  
 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, account for the major share of China’s 
manufacturing imports, while ASEAN increased its share from 5 per cent of China’s 
manufacturing imports in 1995 to 16 per cent in 2010.  South Asia (including India) 











Figure 13. Intraregional trade of Chinese manufacturing sector, 1995-2010 
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In recent years, manufacturing exports by China have been increasingly moving away 
from intraregional markets towards markets outside the region. Although the United States and 
the European Union remain the most important extra- regional destinations, the shares of these 
traditional markets for manufacturing exports have been declining; at the same time, the share 
of Chinese manufacturing exports in the rest of the world increased steadily from 10 per cent in 
1995 to 17 per cent in 2010 (figure 14). 
 












































Asia-Pacific Developing Asia-Pacific United States European Union 25 Rest of the world
 
Source: Calculated by author based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS 
database. 
 
Although India‘s manufacturing sector has been slowly engaging with intraregional 
markets, it has been increasingly turning to the Asia-Pacific region (particularly East Asian 
countries) as a source of its manufacturing imports. India’s share of intraregional imports in 
total manufacturing imports nearly doubled from 22 per cent in 1995 to 42 per cent in 2010 
(figure 15). The increases in India’s intraregional sourcing were largely dominated by imports 
from East and South-East Asia. Since 1995, ASEAN countries have accounted for about 10 
per cent of India’ manufacturing imports, while the share of imports from China, Japan and 
Republic of Korea more than doubled in the same period from 16 per cent  to 34 per cent.  
 
While India is increasingly sourcing more manufacturing imports from within the 
region, export linkages have not grown in the same manner and remain significantly less than 
those of China. Intraregional markets account for less than 30 per cent of Indian manufacturing 
exports throughout the period of the study. The United States and the European Union are still  
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major export destinations for India. However, the share of those traditional markets declined 
from 52 per cent in 1995 to 37 per cent in 2010, while exports to the rest of the world increased 
from 17 per cent to 37 per cent during the same period (figure 16). 
 
Figure 15. Intraregional trade by Indian manufacturing sector, 1995-2010 
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Source: Calculated by author based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS 
database. 
 
5. Foreign direct investment
25 
 
Many studies have documented the fact that the growth of IPNs has been associated 
with FDI inflows because MNCs have primarily built their international production 
networks through FDI.
26 IPN-driven FDI is usually vertical FDI in nature (or so-called 
efficiency-seeking FDI) (Markusen, 2002, and Navaretti and Venables, 2006).
27 This type 
of FDI will lead to an increase in trade within and between firms at different stages of 
production. The manufacturing sector is a primary target for the IPN-driven FDI, because 




25 FDI data should be accepted with caution. There is some opinion that FDI data for China and India 
are inflated as they include a substantial amount of round-tripping FDI through Hong Kong, China in 
the case of China, and through Mauritius in the case of India (Rao and Dhar, 2011; Wei, 2005; and 
Xiao, 2004). In addition, Chinese and Indian FDI data may not be directly comparable due to variations 
in definitions, coverage and availability of the data. 
26 See, for example, Feenstra and others, 2000; Hanson and others, 2001 and 2005; Kleinert, 2003; and 
Swenson, 2004.   
27 See chapter 1 of this book for additional details. 
28 Manufacturing FDI is not always aimed at production for export. A certain (but unfortunately not 
quantifiable) share of FDI may be for market-seeking purposes and circumvention of high import 




Regarding FDI inflows, China has attracted more FDI than India throughout the 
past two decades. FDI net inflows to China increased from US$ 3.5 billion in 1990 to 
US$ 108.3 billion in 2008. For India, FDI net inflows to the country increased from a 
negligible level in the early 1990s to US$ 40.4 billion in 2008. In particular, FDI inflows 
have been increasing rapidly since 2005. However, both China and India recently 
experienced a slowdown of about 10 per cent in FDI inflow in 2009 due to the global 
economic crisis (figure 17).  
 
However, comparing FDI inflows relative to GDP reveals that India is now 
outperforming China if economic size is equal. FDI inflows relative to GDP in India 
increased steadily from 0.9 per cent of GDP to 2.7 per cent of GDP during the past five 
years. The figure for China declined continuously from 3.1 per cent to 1.9 per cent during 
the same period. 
 








































































































































































FDI inflows to China FDI inflows to India
FDI inflows-to-GDP (China) FDI inflows-to-GDP (India)
 
Source: ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011, based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
Sectoral distribution of FDI inflows reveals that MNCs directly investing in China 
have focused on manufacturing activities.
 The manufacturing sector received about 60 per 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
(2011) uses recent firm-level data on the operation of Japanese and United States MNCs in China and 
India in order to deal with these issues.  
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cent of total FDI in China between 2005 and 2008 (figure 18). Recent studies by Dullien 
(2005), and Liu and Dalley (2011) indicated an ongoing transition in manufacturing FDI in 
China from the low-tech manufacturing sector to the high-technology manufacturing sector.  
 
In contrast, the services sector of India attracted much more FDI than the 
manufacturing sector. India’s manufacturing sector accounted for only 21 per cent of FDI 
inflow while services related to finance, infrastructure, IT, real estate and construction, and 
telecommunications accounted for 68 per cent of FDI inflow. 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of FDI inflows to China and India 
by sector, 2005-2008 
(Unit: Per cent) 
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 Source: Based on National Bureau of Statistics data. 
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Existing studies, such as Aggarwal (2001) and Kumar (1990), indicate that 
much of the FDI inflow into India’s manufacturing sector has been largely driven by 
market-seeking and the need to circumvent high import duties. This is consistent with 
a firm-level analysis by Anand and Delios (1996) which found that investment by 
Japanese MNCs in India was largely characterized as market-seeking, while Japanese 
investment in China was more efficiency-seeking and more connected to export 
activities.  
 
6. Intra-regional foreign direct investment 
 
Intraregional investment has played an important role in China. High-income 
East Asian countries are all on the list of top-10 investors in China. Altogether they 
accounted for almost 70 per cent of total FDI inflow into China from 2008 to 2010 
(figure 19). Although there is some debate about round-tripping FDI through Hong 
Kong, China, even after adjusting for round-tripping intraregional FDI is still ahead of 
FDI from outside the region.
29, 30  Singapore, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
together accounted for more than 16 per cent. Other countries on the top-10 list 
included the United States, the United Kingdom and some other European countries.  
 
In the case of India, only 15 per cent of FDI inflows between 2005 and 2009 
originated from Asian countries. Apart from round-tripping FDI from Mauritius, other 
top-10 investors in India during that period were the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other countries in Europe. Only Singapore and Japan were well-













29 The estimated magnitude of round-tripping FDI varied from about 30 per cent of total FDI inflows 
from Hong Kong, China to only 7 per cent. For details see, for example, Huang (2003), Naughton 
(1996), Tseng and Zebregs (2002) and UNCTAD (2007). According to Wei (2005), the magnitude of 
round-tripping FDI in China is supposed to be declining because since 1996 there have been 
continuous reforms in Chinese FDI tax preferences and in the FDI statistical methodologies.  
30 Hong Kong, China is the most important FDI investor in China, accounting for more than a half of 
all FDI inflow. Kalish (2006) pointed out that China’s diaspora in Hong Kong, China has played an 




Figure 19. Distribution of FDI inflows by country of origin  
 























































Source: Based on data from the United States-China Business Council, and China’s Foreign 
Investment Department of the Ministry of Commerce. 
FDI inflows to India, 2005-2009
11.3
7.3





















































Source: Based on data from Rao and Dhar (2011). 
 
The firm-level data on global operations of MNCs in China and  India 
discussed in chapter 3 reveals that intraregional FDI from Japan appears to contribute 
to manufacturing production in India more than extraregional FDI from the United 
States. Based on the size of employment, operations of Japanese MNCs in India are 
concentrated in the transport equipment sector; operations of United States MNCs are  
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concentrated in professional services including IT, scientific and technical services. In 
the case of China, there are no such patterns. Investment in China by Japanese and 
United States MNCs appears to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, with 
computers and electronics capturing the largest share of employment by MNCs.
31 
 
7.  Participation by China and India in the current Asian IPNs 
 
An analysis of exports and imports of parts and components provides a more 
detailed view of the roles of the two countries in Asian IPNs. The best available 
indicator for intensity of an IPN is the share of parts and components in total 
manufacturing trade, because IPN activities normally involve multiple border 
crossings of components. Athukorala (2011) carried out a comprehensive compilation 
of data on trade in parts and components, based on the 5-digit SITC Rev3. He found 
that the rapid development of global production networks in Asian economies was 




During the past two decades, there has been a sharp increase in the share of 
components in world manufacturing trade. The share increased from a two-year 
average of 19 per cent for 1992/1993 to 27 per cent for 2006/2007. The share has 
increased at a much faster rate in developing Asian economies, from 17.3 per cent to 
34 per cent.
34   The share of components is particularly high among ASEAN 
countries.
35  The component share in manufacturing exports from the six ASEAN 
countries combined amounted to 44.2 per cent in 2006/2007, up from 22.7 per cent in 
1992/1993. In countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, components 










31 See Chapter III of this book for additional details. 
32  Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, the term “components” is used in place of “parts and 
components”. 
33 Data on parts and components shown in this section are based on Athukorala, 2011.  
34  Developing Asia in Athukorala (2011) covers 12 developing Asian economies including China, 
Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
35 Among the South-East Asian nations, only the six largest economies – Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Viet Nam – are integrated into global production networks. 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar are not covered 




Table 5. Share of parts and components in manufacturing trade of  
selected economies  
(Unit: Two-year average percentage share) 
Economy Exports  Imports 
  1992/1993  2006/2007 1992/1993 2006/2007 
World 19.3  27.1 19.6 27.3 
Developing Asia  17.3  34.0 29.0 44.2 
China 7.4  25.6 20.4 44.0 
Hong Kong, China  15.8  33.3 24.1 48.5 
Republic of Korea  18.1  47.3 30.1 31.9 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
24.7  44.2 29.5 38.9 
ASEAN 6  22.7  44.2 36.0 47.9 
    Indonesia    3.8  21.5 27.0 21.8 
    Malaysia  27.7  53.6 40.5 50.0 
    Philippines  32.9  71.7 32.6 61.3 
    Singapore  29.0  49.3 39.9 60.4 
    Thailand    14.1  29.9 30.6 36.1 
    Viet Nam  n.a.  11.0 n.a. 19.1 
India 3.0  10.4 17.5 22.9 
 
Source: Based on 5-digit SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
 
The importance of components in intraregional trade of Asia is higher than in 
intraregional trade of the European Union and NAFTA. In 2006/2007, components 
accounted for 54 per cent of intra-developing Asian exports, but only 31 per cent and 
22 per cent of intraregional exports of NAFTA and EU15, respectively (figure 20). A 
similar picture is found for intraregional imports of components. This reflects the fact 
that the intensity of IPNs has been more prominent in developing Asia than in 


















Figure 20. Share of parts and components in intraregional  
manufacturing trade  
 Intraregional manufactuirng exports 











 Intraregional manufacturing imports 











Source: Based on 5-digit SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
Note: * Broader devloping East Asia includes four East Asian developing economies (China, Republic 
of Korea, Hong Kong, China,and Taiwan Provice of China) and six ASEAN countries (Indonesia, 




China has been at the centre of the IPN phenomenon. Components have 
dominated manufacturing imports of China, while final goods have dominated the 
country’s export composition (figure 21). In 2006/07, components accounted for 44 
per cent of Chinese manufacturing imports. The component share in intraregional 
imports by China was much higher at nearly 60 per cent. In contrast, final goods (total 
exports minus components) outpaced China’s manufacturing exports, especially 
exports destined for extraregional markets. Final goods accounted for 75 per cent of 
China’s total manufacturing exports in 2006/07, while the corresponding share of 
intraregional exports was significantly lower at 60 per cent.  
 
Figure 21 Parts and components vs Final goods in China’s manufacturing trade 
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Source: Based on 5 digits SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
 
The production linkages between China and East and South-East Asian countries in 
IPNs are reflected by China’s the components trade, which is particularly high with 
countries in East and South-East Asia. Developing East and South-East Asia accounts for 
about one-half of China’s exports and imports of components for machinery and transport 
equipment. Meanwhile, the central role of China as a major export platform for Asian IPNs 
is reflected in the fact that more than 50 per cent of China’s final goods exports in that 
corresponding category are to extraregional markets, particularly the OECD countries 




Figure 22. Parts and components vs. final goods in China’s trade in machinery 
and transport equipment, by destination 
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In the case of India, the low level of the components trade clearly illustrates 
that India has not participated in the new form of international production sharing 
within the supply chain. As shown in table 5, the share of components in 
manufacturing exports by India remains small, although it increased from 3 per cent 
in 1992/03 to 10 per cent in 2006/07. The corresponding import share increased from 
18 per cent to 23 per cent during the same period; however, the figures were far 
behind those of East and South-East Asian economies.  
 
India’s trade is still largely characterized by a traditional form of international 
trade in finished products (figure 23). In terms of both total and intraregional trade, 
final goods accounted for about 90 per cent of manufacturing exports and nearly 80 
per cent of manufacturing imports in 2006/07. The share of components in India’s 
intraregional trade is trivial. Components accounted for only 14 per cent of 
manufacturing exports to the rest of the region, while imports from the region 
amounted to 25 per cent.  
 
 
Figure 23. Parts and components vs. final goods in India’s manufacturing trade 
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Source: Based on 5 digits SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala (2011), table 9. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
As a precursor to further analysis of the potential of India to become the next 
assembly centre, this chapter evaluates current positions of India in the Asian IPNs, 
using China as a benchmark. The comparative overview shows that the performance 
by China has been ahead of that of India, especially with regard to the manufacturing 
sector and participation in the global IPNs. Patterns of production, employment and 
trade reflect the fact that India has not become significantly integrated into the rapid 
development of IPNs in which the manufacturing of parts and components has been a 




Currently, India’s trade has been focused narrowly on parts of the services 
sector. Consequently, India has failed to capture the benefits of the dynamism of 
Asian IPN growth. India remains an insignificant participant in intraregional trade and 
under-performs in exports of labour-intensive manufactures.  
 
Based on the experience of China, encouraging the integration of India into 
IPNs will need to include an extensive effort to expand the country’s manufacturing 
sector. Evidence shows that IPNs are primarily driven by efficiency-seeking FDI, in 
which factor-cost saving is a prime determinant. Thus, priority should be given to 
supporting export-oriented manufacturing industries that utilize the country’s labour-
cost advantages. Increasing competitiveness will enhance the country’s potential for 
participating in IPNs and, more importantly, employing a larger proportion of the 
population.  
 
In addition, the experience of major countries involving in Asian IPNs reveals 
that the IPN process involves extensive intraregional trade in parts and components. 
This implies that policy priority should be given to reducing trade and transaction 
costs that stand as a major obstacle to multiple cross-border sourcing, which is a vital 
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